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Golden presents several state action issues worthy of resolution
on a national level. The issue of whether a less stringent state action
standard should be applied in cases involving alleged racial discrim-
ination should be definitively answered and the law in the circuits
made uniform on this point. Also, the question of the impact of any
constitutional right which defendant may assert on the state action
decision should be considered so that courts throughout the country
can focus on only the appropriate factors. Finally, and more specifi-
cally, the issue of the nature of state involvement necessary for a
finding of state action in the private club context is worthy of fur-
ther definition by the Court. Moose Lodge made it clear that licens-
ing and regulation are not sufficient. However, Gilmore indicated
that where the state makes public property available for private use,
Moose Lodge is not entirely apposite. Since similar cases are likely
to arise in the future, further guidance would be desirable. The
Supreme Court has, however, denied certiorari in Golden." It is
submitted that this denial was unfortunate as the opportunity to
make important contributions to state action theory was lost.
Louis B. TODISCO
Time, Inc. v. Firestone: Is Rosenbloom Really
Dead?
The author suggests that the Supreme Court has redefined the
once discarded subject matter analysis for determining the appl-
icability of the constitutional privilege in defamation suits and
incorporated it into a new, two-pronged test for determining
whether a defamation plaintiff is a public figure.
Time, a nationally known weekly news magazine, published an
item in its "Milestones"' section informing its readers that Russell
A. Firestone, heir to the tire fortune and wife, Mary Alice Sullivan
tion is the implication of judicial approval of racism. Others include perpetuation of badges
of slavery, the denial of equal opportunity to the excluded class, and lost potential for social
integration. Note, Section 1981 and Private Groups: The Right to Discriminate Versus Free-
dom from Discrimination, 84 YALE L. J. 1441, 1465-69 (1975).
71. 45 U.S.L.W. 3227 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1976).
1. TIME, Dec. 22, 1967, at 77.
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Firestone, were declared divorced on the grounds of "extreme cru-
elty and adultery."' In actuality, when Mrs. Firestone filed her com-
plaint for separate maintenance in the Circuit Court of Palm Beach
County, Florida, her husband had counterclaimed for divorce on
grounds of extreme cruelty and adultery. After discounting testi-
mony of the extramarital affairs of Mrs. Firestone, the judge granted
the counterclaim on the ground that "neither party is domesticated
within the meaning of that term as used by the Supreme Court of
Florida."'
After Time declined to issue a requested retraction,4 Mrs. Fire-
stone filed a libel action in Florida Circuit Court. The jury awarded
her $100,000. After review by both the Florida District Court of
Appeal, Fourth District,5 and the Supreme Court of Florida,' the
judgment was affirmed. On certiorari, the United States Supreme
Court held, vacated and remanded: Although Mrs. Firestone was
not a "public figure" within the framework of analysis discussed in
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. ,' and therefore, Time did not fall within
the constitutional protection enunciated in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan,' no finding of fault on the part of Time in its publication
of the defamatory material was ever found by a Florida trial or
appellate court as required by Gertz.' Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 96 S.
Ct. 958 (1976).
The primary significance of the Firestone decision does not lie
in the holding that the Florida courts failed to make the necessary
finding of fault required by Gertz. Rather, its significance lies in the
fact that the Supreme Court, again faced with the problem of defin-
2. In addition, the article included a statement that "[tihe 17-month intermittent trial
produced enough testimony of extramarital adventures on both sides, said the judge, 'to make
Dr. Freud's hair curl.'"
3. Firestone v. Firestone, 263 So. 2d 223, 225 (Fla. 1972). However, until this point in
time, lack of domestication of the parties had not been recognized by Florida law as grounds
for divorce. Nonetheless, the supreme court upheld the final judgment of divorce on the
ground of extreme cruelty. Id. at 225.
4. Firestone v. Time, Inc., 231 So. 2d 862, 863 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). Under Florida law
the demand for retraction is a prerequisite for filing a libel action, and permits defendants
to limit their potential liability to actual damages by complying with the demand. FLA. STAT.
§§ 770.01, .02 (1975).
5. 279 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973), vacated, 332 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 1976).
6. 305 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1974). The history of the case is detailed in Beckham & Esquiroz,
Torts, Survey of Florida Law, 28 U. MIAMi L. REV. 662, 696-98 (1974).
7. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
8. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
9. 418 U.S. at 347-48.
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ing the "proper accommodation between the law of defamation and
the freedoms of speech and press protected by the First Amend-
ment,""' refused to grant the defendant a constitutional privilege.
In New York Times the Court had given birth to a constitu-
tional privilege against defamation when it held that a public offi-
cial may not recover damages for a defamatory falsehood relating
to his official conduct unless he proves the statement was made with
actual malice or reckless disregard for the truth." The New York
Times privilege was extended in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts'"
where plaintiff, the University of Georgia athletic director, sued for
defamation as a result of a magazine article alleging that he had
fixed a football game. Although BRuttg was not a public official, the
Court still required him to prove actual malice or reckless disregard
for the truth because the constitutional privilege was extended to
cover publication of matter concerning any "public figure."
To resolve the issues in Firestone, the Court focused on the
guidelines set down in Gertz, where the Supreme Court held that a
public figure is one who occupies "[a role] of especial prominence
in the affairs of society" and has been "thrust . . .to the forefront
of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution
of the issues involved." Adapting the Gertz Court's test for a public
figure, the Court in Firestone determined that the issue before it was
whether the respondent, Mrs. Firestone, had assumed "any role of
especial prominence in the affairs of society" or had "thrust herself
to the forefront of any particular public controversy in order to
influence the resolution of the issues involved in it."' 3 However, the
Court was forced to apply the Gertz test to a plaintiff who fell
somewhere in the sphere between a "private person" and a person
traditionally perceived as a public figure.
The Court found that Mrs. Firestone was not a public figure.
In doing so, it rejected Time's contention that because the Firestone
divorce was characterized by the Supreme Court of Florida as a
cause celebre,'" it must have been a public controversy. Mr. Justice
Rehnquist, writing the majority opinion, relied on the Gertz Court's
10. Id. at 325.
11. 376 U.S. at 279-80.
12. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
13. 96 S. Ct. at 965.
14. 271 So. 2d 745, 751 (1972).
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repudiation of Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.' In Rosenbloom,
the plaintiff sued a radio station for libel because the station broad-
cast stories about obscenity charges against the plaintiff. The Court
held that when a matter of public or general interest is published,
a private individual may recover for libel only if he can prove that
the publication was made with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard for the truth.
After the Rosenbloom decision, when deciding the question of
what standard of liability extended to a media defendant, a court
was first required to focus its attention on the particular plaintiff
to determine if he was a public figure. If the Court found the plain-
tiff to be a private individual, then the emphasis shifted to the
subject matter of the libel. "If a matter is a subject of public or
general interest,"" then the defendant was found to enjoy a consti-
tutional protection in the form of an actual malice test.
In Gertz, the Supreme Court chose to recede from
Rosenbloom's broad application of the New York Times standard
and substituted a two-tiered constitutional standard for libel law.
The first tier is the New York Times privilege which may be invoked
in libel actions involving plaintiffs with public status. The second
tier is a less vigorous protection of publishers and broadcasters from
liability, requiring a finding of fault when injury is claimed by plain-
tiffs of private status.'7 In analyzing the public status of a person
for the purpose of the first tier, the Gertz court stated:
For the most part those who attain this [public] status have
assumed roles of especial prominence in the affairs of society.
Some occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence
that they are deemed public figures for all purposes. More com-
monly, those classed as public figures have thrust themselves to
the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influ-
ence the resolution of the issues involved."'
A common interpretation of this language, coupled with Gertz's
repudiation of Rosenbloom, has provided support for the proposi-
tion that the focal point of analysis in determining "public figure"
status rests solely on the activities of the individual and that the
15. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
16. Id. at 43.
17. For a detailed discussion of the two-tiered standard evolving from Gertz see 29 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 367 (1975).
18. 418 U.S. at 345.
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subject matter analysis employed in Rosenbloom is defunct.
Further support for this contention rests on the fact that in Gertz,
the Court pointed to Mr. Gertz's activities" in holding that: "He
plainly did not thrust himself into the vortex of this public issue,
nor did he engage the public's attention in an attempt to influence
its outcome."' "
In Firestone the Court continued its trend in receding from a
broad application of the New York Times standard. Rather than
directing its attention solely to the activities of the plaintiff, the
Court seemed to revive some of the policies behind Rosenbloom and
proceeded through a new two-pronged analysis. The Court looked
first to the activities of the plaintiff and then to the subject matter
of the controversy involved. This results in a balancing test. If the
activities of the plaintiff are clearly private, it would become ex-
tremely difficult for the public nature of the controversy to tip the
scales in favor of holding the person to be a public figure. The
subject matter only becomes significant when the activities of the
plaintiff are somewhere between private and public in nature.
Although this analysis is not specifically enunciated, it is im-
plicit in the majority's opinion.2 ' The Court examined the plaintiff's
actions and found that she did not "freely choose to publicize issues
as to the propriety of her married life" but rather that "[sihe was
compelled to go to court."2 The Court also thought it significant to
examine the subject matter of the controversy. It pointed out that
"[dlissolution of a marriage through judicial proceedings is not the
sort of 'public controversy' referred to in Gertz .... ,,13
The necessity for the Court to make this type of analysis raises
the following question: What would the result have been if Mrs.
Firestone had brought suit to enjoin busing of students instead of a
separate maintenance action? One could argue that because of Mrs.
Firestone's status as the wife of a member of a wealthy industrial
family with the ability to call press conferences (as she did in the
actual case) 4 that she would fall within the vague sphere between
19. Id. at 352.
20. Id.
21. Justice Marshall, in his dissent stated that the court was incorrect in using any
analysis which included an examination of the subject matter of the controversy. See note
25, infra.
22. 96 S. Ct. at 965.
23. Id.
24. Id. at n.3.
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the public and private person, thereby requiring a shift in analysis
to the subject matter of the controversy. The court could find the
anti-busing issue to be within the purview of the "public contro-
versy" referred to in Gertz, although a dissolution of marriage
through judicial proceedings was not; the former issue being suffi-
cient to tip the scales in favor of granting the privilege, whereas the
latter is not. If this would be the result, the subject matter analysis
involving the "private" individual in Rosenbloom has not been to-
tally displaced, but rather has been limited, redefined, and incorpo-
rated into a "public figure" analysis consistent with Gertz.2"
The Firestone opinion also leaves open an interesting question
concerning the public figure issue itself: Can a person be a public
figure within a limited geographical area such as a community? The
opinion seems to raise this question in passing but offers limited
assistance in answering it. The Court stated that Mrs. Firestone
"did not assume any role of especial prominence in the affairs of
society other than perhaps Palm Beach society .. ."I' Perhaps the
policy considerations behind the Gertz holding, including the pro-
motion of wide-open debate and the avoidance of self-censorship,
would call for an extension of the public figure doctrine to a limited
community. There is no indication in Gertz whether the community
leader involved in local controversies is the type of public figure the
Court envisioned.
The language used in Firestone seems to indicate that being a
public figure within a community such as Palm Beach is not suffi-
cient to warrant an actual malice test. The Firestone Court did not
believe that Mrs. Firestone was included in the ambit of people to
whom the Gertz opinion was referring in their description of a public
figure. A distinguishing factor which could be raised is that al-
though Mrs. Firestone may have been a public figure in Palm
25. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall disagrees with the majority's willingness
to examine the subject matter of the controversy. According to Marshall
Itlhe meaning that the Court attributes to the term "public controversy" used
in Gertz resurrects the precise difficulties that I thought Gertz was designed to
avoid. . ..
...Gertz obviously did not intend to sanction any such inquiry by its use
of the term "public controversy." Yet that is precisely how I understand the
Court's opinion to interpret Gertz.
96 S. Ct. at 981.
26. !d. at 965.
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Beach, the Time publication of the alleged libel transcended Palm
Beach into the hands of readers throughout the country. The prob-
lem with this rationale is that it shifts the emphasis from the activi-
ties of the public figure and the subject-matter of the controversy
to the geographic location of the publisher's readers. Would there
then be adequate justification for holding that a local newspaper in
Palm Beach could have published the same article which appeared
in Time magazine and have been afforded the New York Times
privilege?
Whether a person may be a public figure within a limited com-
munity is uncertain. In light of the Court's refusal to find as a public
figure, a person who had voluntarily become a member of the
"sporting set," a social group with special prominence in the affairs
of society and whose activities predictably attracted the attention
of a sizable portion of the public and who not only had access to the
media for rebuttal but in fact used the media by calling press con-
ferences, it appears that the sentiment of the present Court indi-
cates a rather limited view 7 of the public figure doctrine.
The Court also rejected Time's argument that the privilege
should extend to all reports of judicial proceedings by relying on two
different factors. Initially, the Court refused any broadening of the
rule set out in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,2" which had held
that a state may not impose sanctions on the accurate publication
of information obtained from judicial records that are maintained
in connection with a public prosecution and are therefore open to
public inspection. Justice Rehnquist rejected Time's contention
that because judicial proceedings contain some informational value
on matters of "public or general interest", an actual malice test
should apply. In so doing, the Court renounced a subject matter
analysis in favor of "one focusing upon the character of the defama-
tion plaintiff."2 According to the Court:
[E]recting the New York Times barrier against all plaintiffs
seeking to recover from defamatory falsehoods published in what
27. As seen through his dissent, Justice Marshall would disagree with a limited extension
of the public figure doctrine. He indicates that a person could be a public figure within a
limited community. He envisions the sole focus of analysis to be centered on the actions of
the individual. As such, the voluntary membership in the "sporting set" combined with the
access to rebut by use of press conferences was sufficient for Justice Marshall to find Mrs.
Firestone to be a public figure.
28. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
29. 96 S. Ct. at 966.
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are alleged to be reports of judicial proceedings would effect sub-
stantial depreciation of the individual's interest in protection
from such harm, without any convincing assurance that such a
sacrifice is required under the First Amendment."
The Court did not specifically address the abandoning of the
subject matter analysis except in its discussion on the extension of
the New York Times privilege to all judicial proceedings. In- light of
the sweeping language of the Court," it is difficult to pinpoint
whether the subject matter analysis was rejected per se or was, more
logically, intended to be eliminated only when discussing the issue
of reports on judicial proceedings. As noted earlier, it is suggested
that the subject matter analysis has not been abandoned in the
resolution of the question of who or what constitutes a public figure.
It is difficult to delineate any concrete policy considerations for
the Court's discrimination in applying a subject matter test. Per-
haps Justice Rehnquist was offering some assistance when he
stated: "The details of many, if not most, courtroom battles would
add almost nothing towards advancing the uninhibited debate on
public issues thought to provide principle support for the decision
in New York Times."3
A valid challenge to this conclusion may rest on the notion that
important social change involving controversial subject matters
often occurs in the courtroom. It would seem that the opportunity
for "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate" would be discour-
aged if the media was unable to report on the developments of a case
involving a controversial issue such as civil rights, for fear of a libel
suit.
It might be questioned whether Justice Rehnquist's reasoning
is sufficient to justify total abandonment of a subject matter analy-
sis in deciding the question of whether a media defendant's report
of a judicial proceeding is privileged. It would seem more consistent
to apply the same type of two-pronged balancing analysis used when
30. Id.
31. The Court stated that
[wihatever their general validity, use of such subject matter classifications to
determine the extent of constitutional protection afforded defamatory falsehoods
may too often result in an improper balance between the competing interests in
this area. It was our recognition and rejection of this weakness in the Rosenbloom
test which led us in Gertz to eschew a subject matter test for one focusing upon
the character of the defamation plaintiff.
Id.
32. Id. (citations omitted).
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evaluating the public figure status of an individual and maintain a
subject matter analysis, but limit the extension of the privilege to
the "public controversy" intended by Gertz. When such a contro-
versy is present, the media defendant should be afforded the New
York Times privilege.
The second factor relied on by the Court in refusing to extend
the privilege to reports of all judicial proceedings focuses on the
"involuntary" aspect of the plaintiff's actions. Justice Rehnquist
noted that:
[Wlhile participants in some litigation may be legitimate "pub-
lic figures," either generally or for the limited purpose of that
litigation, the majority will more likely resemble respondent,
drawn into a public forum largely against their will in order to
attempt to obtain the only redress available to them. . . .There
appears little reason why these individuals should substantially
forfeit that degree of protection which the law of defamation
would otherwise afford them simply by virtue of their being
drawn into a courtroom."
The Court had also analyzed this voluntary versus involuntary
aspect of the plaintiff's actions with respect to the public figure
question. In discussing that issue, Justice Rehnquist stated that
Mrs. Firestone
was compelled to go to court by the State in order to obtain legal
release from the bonds of matrimony. We have said that in such
an instance "[riesort to the judicial process . . . is no more
voluntary in a realistic sense than that of the defendant called
upon to defend his interests in court." 34
This discussion of the voluntary versus the involuntary aspects
of a plaintiff's actions as a factor to consider in evaluating whether
to extend the New York Times privilege leaves open a perplexing
question: Can a plaintiff be involuntarily thrust into the forefront
of a public issue, thus granting the media defendant a privilege?
Mr. Justice Powell's opinion in Gertz offers little guidance in
answering this question. There he stated: "Hypothetically, it may
be possible for someone to become a public figure through no pur-
poseful action of his own, but the instances of truly involuntary
33. Id. at 966-67.
34. Id. at 965 quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 376 (1971).
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public figures must be exceedingly rare."35 Later in the opinion,
Justice Powell seems to assume broader possibilities of becoming an
involuntary public figure when he states that "[m]ore commonly,
an individual voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particu-
lar public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a
limited range of issues. '3 This language seems to contradict the
"exceedingly rare" language quoted above.
The Firestone opinion offers no further assistance in resolving
this question. The loose reference to the lack of any truly voluntary
action on the part of the plaintiff does not offer sufficient guidelines
for future courts. The limited analysis by the Court may possibly
be justified by the facts of the particular case, but the Court could
nevertheless have provided more definite standards for determining
public figure status.
In view of the majority's decision in Firestone, it would be
difficult to predict the outcome if the Rosenbloom facts were before
the Court today. The Court's treatment of both the public figure
and reports of judicial proceedings issues indicates that a different
result might occur. Unfortunately, the pendulum appears to be
swinging away from the necessary protections of the free press. The
question now becomes how far back the Court will let the pendulum
go. In order to avoid self-censorship of the press and to facilitate the
airing of views on public issues, the Court must stop at this point
and evaluate whether the line should be drawn at Firestone. It is
submitted that the Court should not go further.
LAWRENCE A. JONES
35. 418 U.S. at 345.
36. Id. at 351.
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